Over the weekend, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that the country’s two top generals – Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli – would be removed from office and investigated for serious disciplinary violations.
Zhang had been the top general of the People’s Liberation Army since October 2022. He was the highest-ranking military member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CCP), the 24-member executive policy-making body of the party-state.
Zhang was also senior vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, which controls the armed forces.
Liu was the former commander of the PLA’s ground forces and had most recently headed the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission.
The reaction to these developments outside China has led to dramatic headlines. A BBC headline initially focused on a “military in crisis,” while the Australian Broadcasting Corporation called it an “astonishing” purge that leaves Chinese leader Xi Jinping virtually alone at the top of the world’s largest military.
Certainly, the moves were surprising. But so little is known about the inner workings of the CCP leadership, including Xi’s relations with his colleagues in the Politburo, that interpreting these developments is difficult, if not impossible.
Here’s what we know
For historical and political reasons, the PLA is an organization of the CCP. Both fall under the direct authority of Xi, who is chairman of the Central Military Commission, general secretary of the CCP and president of the country.
The removal of Zhang and Liu leaves the military leadership at least temporarily under just Xi and General Zhang Shengmin. Three other members of the Central Military Commission have lost their positions since 2024 and have not been replaced.
Although China’s leadership is notoriously opaque, it is clear that there have been disciplinary problems within the military in recent years, especially related to corruption and procurement in the PLA’s more technically advanced branches. Since 2022, around 20 senior military figures have been dismissed or investigated.
Zhang and Liu were relatively recent appointments to even higher positions. Both were also seen as personal supporters of Xi. Xi and Zhang’s fathers had a close relationship dating back to the early days of the CCP in the 1930s, before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
Moreover, the removals of Zhang and Liu occurred faster than other high-ranking military resignations in recent years – and there were fewer warning signs. Both men had appeared in public only a month ago.
Perhaps even more surprisingly, the Wall Street Journal reported that Zhang is accused of providing the United States with information about China’s nuclear weapons program, along with accusations of taking bribes and forming “political cliques.”
What will happen next?
Experience shows beyond any doubt that once a high-ranking figure loses his status or is dismissed – for whatever reason – his downfall results in accusations of a litany of crimes.
The Politburo has also seen its share of intense internal politics in the past, although the precise circumstances of such conflicts typically take years to emerge. A good example is the mysterious death in 1971 of Lin Biao, another former PLA commander who was Mao Zedong’s designated successor at the time.
Given the broader context at play here with the management of the military and the development of government programs in recent years, as well as the claims that Zhang and Liu violated “discipline and the law,” there are two possible explanations for their dismissal.
Both may have been directly involved in corruption, taking bribes to appoint officials or secure contracts for suppliers. It is equally likely that they will be held responsible for the corruption that undoubtedly occurred in military procurement under their watch.
Then there is the possibility of a disagreement within the Central Military Commission and the Politburo over how to deal with corruption, especially within the military.
Xi has repeatedly emphasized the importance of fighting corruption since becoming CCP General Secretary in 2012.
In recent weeks, he has turned it into an even more important crusade in the context of the soon-to-be announced 15th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. On January 12, he labeled the issue of corruption as a “big battle” in a speech to China’s top anti-corruption agency:
‘Currently, the situation in the fight against corruption remains serious and complex […] “We must maintain a high-pressure attitude without wavering, resolutely punish corruption wherever it exists, eliminate all forms of corruption and leave no room for corrupt elements to hide,” he said.
To achieve China’s development goals, he added, the CCP must “deploy cadres who are truly loyal, trustworthy, consistent and responsible.”
It’s hard to see Zhang and Liu or anyone else wanting or being able to challenge Xi at this point. Or even more, that Xi might immediately feel threatened by Zhang, Liu or others.
To this extent, Xi’s personal position is neither strengthened nor weakened by these dismissals.
Other analysts have suggested that the disruptions caused by the layoffs could erode Xi’s confidence in his military. Some have even said that the likelihood of an invasion of Taiwan has now diminished.
The removal of so many leaders may indicate that the PLA is now expected to undergo a culture change. At the same time, it would be a stretch to suggest that its military capacity, in general or with regard to Taiwan, has been strengthened or weakened.
David SG Goodman, Director, China Studies Centre, Professor of Chinese Politics, University of Sydney
David SG Goodman does not work for, consult with, own shares in, or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
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