Mikel Arteta didn’t seem to see it that way, though, and rewatching the game it’s easy to understand why.
“We struggled in the first ten minutes and arrived a little late. They played through us and created some open space situations which they are very dangerous in,” said Arteta after the game.
“After that we adjusted, got a little more control, two big chances from Viktor and one messy situation inside the penalty area, but we couldn’t score. In the second half it clicked.”
The second half was the most enjoyable part for Arsenal fans, with the match unlocked by Gabriel’s opener from a Bukayo Saka corner, and Arsenal didn’t give up from there, putting the game to bed with goals from Martin Zubimendi, Leandro Trossard and substitute Gabriel Jesus.
However, the platform for success came with Arteta’s first-half adjustments. Although Villa had some big openings early in the match, Arsenal took control much earlier than half-time. Defensively, Arsenal were vulnerable early on, but as Arteta said, it was mostly about misalignment of timing or understanding between players, rather than structural issues that needed to be resolved.
Arsenal pushed high and with real aggression from the start, with Mikel Merino and Martin Zubimendi or Martin Odegaard marking Villa’s midfielders Youri Tielemans and Amadou Onana in the build-up and Gabriel Morgan tracking Rogers deep in his own half, leaving William Saliba to deal with Ollie Watkins up front.
The gaps that Villa broke through may seem too aggressive at Arsenal, but it was, as Arteta said, more to do with the timing of the press, and some unfortunate attacks coming towards Villa. Arsenal were actually most vulnerable when they were less aggressive.
When Gabriel Rogers followed, Arsenal limited Villa generally well.
Onana’s early burst through the field came after Gabriel had successfully forced Rogers all the way back into his own penalty area.
The fact that this led to anything was mainly due to bad luck. Arsenal had forced Villa into a clearance and Piero Hincapie won the ball on the halfway line but fell to the ground in the process. His interception deflected off Mikel Merino and fell into the path of Amadou Onana, who started an attack into the penalty area, through the space Hincapie would have defended had he kept his balance.
This wasn’t a case of Arsenal being out of form or over-enthusiastic, but of the bounces falling Villa’s way. Even then, William Saliba defended the situation flawlessly.
Villa’s other half-time moments looked and felt hairy at the time and it was fair to wonder whether Arsenal should keep an extra man behind them, but in reality the visitors would likely break the press if Gabriel wasn’t good enough for Rogers, allowing the England international to wander, be outnumbered and break away from Arsenal’s midfield.
And despite the perceived threat, Arsenal always had enough men back to outpace Villa and force them off goal. These moments felt more threatening than they actually were and Arsenal handled them quite comfortably, with plenty of players in support.
From the 19th minute until half-time, Villa failed to get a shot off (Arsenal took five) and completed only four final third passes into Arsenal’s 35.
So without the ball, Arsenal were most effective when they were most aggressive. There were early problems with the ball before a tweak from Mikel Arteta
Remember, Villa didn’t get a shot from the 19th minute onwards. That’s almost exactly when a change was made to Piero Hincapie’s role as Arsenal were building up. A quick solution saw Arsenal open up more options to advance the ball and push Villa back into their own half.
In the opening stages, Hincapie would line up on the left of what looked like a back three in possession, with Villa matching this with a three-man press consisting of (from right to left) Jadon Sancho, Morgan Rogers and Ollie Watkins. Hincapie and Sancho are circled in the examples below.
With this pressing form, Villa were comfortable. Arsenal lacked access to central areas and did not have the numbers to play the ball to their wingers in an advantageous manner, with Leandro Trossard and Bukayo Saka both under immediate pressure when the ball went out to them.
It was this problem, and not the problem with Arsenal’s defensive shape or midfield, that led to the best chance of the first half.
Gabriel was on the ball with no options for a pass. The three-man Villa press denies any access to the center of the pitch, while a pass-out can be pushed wide by Watkins or (again circled) Sancho. Arsenal can outscore Villa around the ball four to three, but they don’t discover any advantage with their extra man.
So Gyokeres falls to give Arsenal an extra man and Gabriel plays the ball into the feet.
The pass is not the best, the intention is read by Ezri Konsa and the Swede fails to get his body in a good position to receive and protect the ball.
Villa takes possession and is away from Arsenal’s central defenders.
It’s no wonder Watkins is played in a great position from here and Arsenal are lucky he doesn’t make the most of it.
But an adjustment to Hincapie’s positioning in these scenarios helped Arsenal push back Villa. Around the 18 minute mark, the Ecuadorian (circled in yellow below) begins to push into advanced areas from the left back. Arsenal are still building with three players, but suddenly Sancho (circled in black) has a question to answer: does he stick with that pressing form, or does he go back with Hincapie to help makeshift right-back Lamare Bogarde and midfielder Amadou Onana, who may suddenly have to deal with Leandro Trossard instead of sticking with Mikel Merino.
The answer is clear for Sancho: he must go back and follow his man…
… With Zubimendi now part of the temporary back three in possession and Merino sometimes dropping deeper than before, Arsenal managed to pin Villa back into their own half, with their press having no influence on proceedings at all.
With three against two and an extra player wide, Arsenal always found a free man on the left and were also able to comfortably carry the ball out from the back.
Hincapie positioned himself narrower than Trossard, creating opportunities for the Belgian to play one-on-one against Sancho, rather than a more defensive player.
On some occasions Trossard was free to receive the ball completely unmarked…
… in others, Sancho was dragged inside and right-back Bogarde was pulled back towards Trossard rather than remaining in his narrower position where he could defend the penalty area.
The shift in Hincapie’s approach was so pronounced that there was even the rare occasion when he made a run and was Arsenal’s furthest player forward, past Viktor Gyokeres up front…
…and where Arsenal sometimes struggled to win loose balls on the edge of the Villa pitch in the opening stages, they now had the aggressive, tenacious nature that Hincapie brings to those counter-pressing scenarios, killing some of Villa’s counter-attacking threat before those counters could even start.
In this scenario, Hincapie jumps into a 50-50 and forces a loose ball towards Merino, who immediately plays back into the Villa box with a snappy pass to Gyokeres.
It is the second half of this goal-rich victory that will be remembered fondly, but make no mistake, it was a smart change in just 18 minutes as Arsenal asserted their authority and snuffed out the early encouragement they had given to an opposition side who arrived in North London having won eleven games in a row in all competitions. Remember, Villa threatened early, but they didn’t have a shot between the 18th minute and Gabriel’s opening in the 48th minute.
The adjustment to Hincapie’s role saw Arsenal push Villa back and dominate the area, with Villa’s foothold reduced with the press weakened and one of their most creative players forced to act as an extra right-back.
It took a corner to break the deadlock, but it was this change that put Arteta’s side on top after a difficult first 15-20 minutes and gave them the platform to “click” and find the levels where they could win comfortably.
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