How coup-proofing in Sudan has left 30 million people in need of humanitarian aid

In 2024, Sudan had 5 billion barrels oil reservesThis puts the country on par with other oil-rich states such as Canada (with 4.3 billion) and Mexico (with 5.1 billion). Despite this abundance of natural resources, Sudan is facing one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21^st century, while the UN reported it 30 million people need humanitarian aid.

The crisis is caused by an ongoing conflict between the Sudanese army – led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (who is de facto president of Sudan) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), who also served as al-Burhan’s former deputy during the transition period. Both men helped organize the coup to oust former leader Omar al-Bashir in 2019, following ongoing protests. But instead of allowing a civilian government to rule, everyone pushed for it control about the Sudanese government and army.

Tensions were high over the issues of integrating the 100,000-strong RSF into the Sudanese army – and who would command this unified force. By means of April 15^e shots were fired in 2023, marking the start of the conflict and leading to the displacement of more than 2023 people 13 million people. Although a ceasefire agreement has been accepted by the RSF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk said Friday that “there is no sign of de-escalation” of the war.

Coup-proofing the security sector

Sudan’s transition from authoritarian rule was doomed from the start, as Bashir left behind a regime that had once been coup proven. As there were 169 coup attempts in Africa, leaders between 1950 and 2010 often took steps to prevent coups. In Sudan, two of the main strategies to prove a coup for the regime included supporting the creation of parallel militias and recruiting soldiers along ethnic and tribal lines to ensure loyalty.

In 2013Bashir formalized the RSF by uniting the loosely organized Janjaweed militias under a single command structure. The Janjaweed were Arab-majority militias funded by Bashir to suppress the rebels in Darfur. ethnic cleansing campaign. Ultimately the RSF became Sudan’s most powerful paramilitary group and was crucial in protecting Bashir from coups and assassination attempts by the regular army- with Bashir referring to Hemedti as “my protector.”

Bashir had already confirmed his National Intelligence and Security Services (secret police) to become a regularized force by 2008, ensuring a more effective counterbalance to the military. The officers received military ranks, with the top leadership drawing heavily from the river tribes.

Supporting parallel militias and other armed units as a counterweight to the regular army is one thing common tactics of dictatorships that (rightly) fear that the military poses the greatest threat to their political survival. Instead of supporting a national army that should be committed to protecting the nation from outside threats, tribal militias and presidential guards are being created to protect the regimeand the leader is deposed. This militias are often provided with better weapons and superior training, giving them greater confidence in their military capabilities.

The decentralization of violenceThe absence of central government forces complicates post-authoritarian transitions because there are multiple armed groups, often with strong tribal, ethnic or sectarian identities (deliberately cultivated by the former leader) that refuse to lay down their arms and give up power. Research has shown that paramilitary groups that are ethnically homogeneous are more able and willing to use repression. Homogeneity simplifies coordination and communication and strengthens the perception of an external threat.

In the aftermath of the ouster of a coup-resistant regime, conflict and chaos often ensued, as in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein supported the powerful Fedayeen paramilitaries and cultivated tribal networks; in Libya, where Muammar Gaddafi supported numerous tribal militias, with the 32^i.e The brigade (which was commanded by one of Gaddafi’s sons) was the best equipped and well trained; and in Yemen, where former president Ali Abdullah Saleh boasted that he had half a million tribesmen who could mobilize their own weapons and ammunition under his command. In all three cases, the presence of numerous paramilitaries and other armed groups made it virtually impossible to achieve stability following an authoritarian collapse.

These forces are often undisciplined – trained only in violence, but not bound by formal codes of respect for human rights. As such, they are more likely to engage in genocide and others crimes against humanity.

Catastrophe in Sudan

As Al-Burhan and Hemedti’s forces failed to merge, the RSF resumed attacks on civilians in Darfur. 2023; this is in addition to the carnage wrought by the Janjaweed militias in Darfur in the 2000s, with at least 300,000 people dead. Although both the army and the RSF have engaged in and been accused of violence war crimesthe RSF is encouraged by the absence of responsibility.

Citizens have paid the price – as some have 150,000 up from 400,000 have been killed in the two years since the fighting began. Reportedly just last month 2,000 people in the town of el-Fasher were massacred by the RSF. The BBC reported that an RSF soldier claimed that “our job is nothing but killing.”

The fighting has also led to an economic collapse and rising food and fuel prices. The AND has reported that this has led to a hunger crisis, with more than half of the population facing acute food insecurity and part of the population facing famine.

Just two weeks after the RSF took over the famine-stricken city of al-Fasher, the RSF agreed to a humanitarian ceasefire proposed by the Quad (the US, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) on November 6^e. But these ceasefire proposals have been met with little agreement in the past by both the RSF and the Sudanese military success.

Although legitimized established by the international community early in the transition, both al-Burhan and Hemedti have made repeated commitments only to break them. Instead of punishing both leaders, the West assumed that al-Burhan and Hemedti were reputable political players.

To truly achieve a long-term cessation of hostilities, these various paramilitary groups established under Bashir’s tenure must be fully disarmed and demobilized. Otherwise, a future peace agreement has no chance of succeeding in the long term.