Behavioral geopolitics: what it means for the coming years

Over the past three weeks I have been giving you my reading of the scientific literature on how power transforms people, why governments with limited control over their power so often become corruptand recent research showing that More powerful countries feel threatened more easily and are therefore likely to attack other countries. As a reminder, I am not an expert in this field (far from it), so I may have misinterpreted some things or be unaware of other results. In what should have been the last post of this series, I wanted to summarize my thoughts on what this all means for today’s great powers, if I read these results correctly. But when I drafted this post, it became very long. That’s why I decided to use only the American part this week and add another part about China, Russia and the EU next week.

It is clear that the US is the most powerful nation in the world in terms of military might and economic prowess. But as we can see from the actions of Donald Trump, as well as most presidents before him, this does not stop the country’s political leadership from feeling threatened by much weaker opponents. Since the end of World War II, this has led to military interventions in Vietnam, several Latin American countries (Cuba, Grenada, Panama, etc.) and more recently to the ill-fated wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

If there is an example of the idea that more powerful countries feel more threatened by adversaries than less powerful countries, it is the United States.

An interesting finding from Caleb Pomeroy’s research is that even liberals become more aggressive when they believe the US has more power in the world. Although the effect is stronger for conservatives.

Militant internationalism increases when people feel that the US is more powerful

Source: Pomeroy (2023)

In my opinion, the recent US intervention in Venezuela has all the hallmarks of this behavioral effect. Donald Trump, who campaigned in 2016 to get the US out of foreign wars and an America First agenda, has suddenly become an interventionist president.

This started on an economic level with the tariffs on most trading partners, but especially China, and later the bailout for a friendly government in South America (Argentina). The intervention in Venezuela was the first military intervention, but in my opinion it will probably not be the last.

A second trend observable in the Trump administration is the rise of corruption among political elites, as democratic checks and balances have been weakened. With Congress unable or unwilling to limit presidential powers over trade and war, even though the U.S. Constitution explicitly grants these powers to Congress, the Trump administration has increasingly used its executive powers to help its allies economically.

The bailout for Argentina has since probably helped American investors more than the Argentine people most of the money appears to have been used to pay off loans owned by US funds. Meanwhile, the main beneficiary of the military intervention in Venezuela is US oil giant Chevron, which was already active in the country, plus other oil and gas companies that are likely to gain access to the country’s oil resources.

During his press conference on January 3, 2026, Donald Trump implicitly made it clear that the ultimate goal of the operation was not to help the Venezuelan people or overthrow a corrupt government (or, for that matter, reduce the flow of cocaine into the US), but simply to gain access to oil.

Mentions during Trump’s press conference on January 3

Source: Rollcall.com

In the future, I expect more military and economic interventions from the US in its area of ​​influence (i.e. the Western Hemisphere), but also in Europe, Africa and Asia when they feel threatened by the actions of competing superpowers such as China.

I don’t think a Chinese blockade of Taiwan or other moves to unify Taiwan with mainland China are something the Trump administration would be particularly concerned about. However, they would clearly be concerned about losing access to the high-tech semiconductors produced in Taiwan. This is why I think the South China Sea resolution will ultimately be a deal (explicit or tacit) between the US and Chinese leaders, whereby the US will let China absorb Taiwan as long as China guarantees an uninterrupted supply of Taiwanese semiconductors.

When will that happen? No one knows, but I think towards the end of Trump and Vance’s terms would be an opportune time for the Chinese.

The heightened threat perception (or should I say paranoia?) of the government of the most powerful nation in the world will also lead to further interventions against allies if necessary. There has been a lot of talk about the US attempt to take Greenland from Denmark, but for me the most important development is Europe’s rearmament.

Today, the US government forces European NATO countries to rearm and defend themselves rather than rely on US security guarantees. In the Pacific region, the US is exerting the same pressure on South Korea and Japan. And these countries are rapidly increasing their defense spending.

But what will the world look like in about five years when the rearmament of Europe and its East Asian allies has brought about greater self-reliance and self-confidence in these countries? Remember that a nation that feels more powerful is likely to become more aggressive internationally and perceive other nations as a greater threat.

Could it be that Europeans will take a more assertive stance against U.S. tariffs and other forms of economic coercion?

Could European rearmament ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Atlantic alliance and a more competitive relationship between Europe and the US?

And how would the US government respond if it views Europe, Japan or South Korea as a threat to its interests?

I hope we don’t go down this path, but you can see how quickly the behavioral geopolitical insights I discussed earlier could backfire on the US government and lead us to some very worrying scenarios.

I would like to end this week with this as this post has already become quite long. Next week I will expand these thoughts on the other three regions I am interested in: China, Russia and the EU.