MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jan 26 (IPS) – When Ugandans went to the polls on January 15, there was no doubt about the outcome. As voting began, mobile internet services ground to a halt, ensuring minimal control as President Yoweri Museveni secured his seventh consecutive term in office. Rather than offering a democratic choice, the vote cemented one of Africa’s longest-running presidencies, providing a veneer of democratic legitimacy while stifling competition.
Four decades in power
Museveni’s four-decade hold on power began with the Bush War, a guerrilla conflict that brought him to power in 1986. One-party government lasted almost twenty years and was considered necessary for national reconstruction. The 1995 constitution granted autonomy to parliament and the judiciary and introduced a presidential limit of two terms in office and an age limit of 75 years, but maintained the ban on political parties.
With one-party rule increasingly being called into question, Museveni restored multi-party politics in 2005. At the same time, however, he orchestrated a constitutional amendment to eliminate term limits. In 2017, he abolished the age restriction, allowing him to run for a sixth term in 2021.
The recent elections were marked by state violence. Musevenis Campaign 2021 against opposition challenger Bobi Wine was marked by government brutality, with more than a hundred people killed in protests following Wine’s arrest in November 2020. Another opposition leader, Kizza Besigyehas been arrested or detained more than a thousand times over the years.
Museveni promoted his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, as chief of the armed forces in 2024. Kainerugaba has openly boasted on social media about torturing political opponents, reflecting a regime that no longer bothers to hide its brutality. Its emergence indicates a possible hereditary transmission.
Closure of public space
In the face of a credible challenge from the opposition, this year’s elections required more than constitutional tinkering: they demanded a systematic reduction of civic space. That of the Trump administration dissolution of USAID in early 2025, Museveni helped do this because it was catastrophic for Ugandan civil society. Almost all of them US-funded good governance and civil society programs were canceled, hollow out the civic education networks that once reached rural and rural voters. State propaganda filled the vacuum.
A coordinated attack on dissent followed. Between June and October, climate and environmental activists were repeatedly denied bail and spent months in jail for peacefully protesting the East African crude oil pipeline. The regime’s reach extended beyond borders: in November 2024, so did Besigye kidnapped in Nairobi and appeared days later before a military court in Kampala charged with capital crimes, despite a Supreme Court ruling declaring military trials for civilians unconstitutional. Museveni just legalized the practice in June 2025.
The intimidation increased as the vote approached. Authorities arrested Sarah Bireete, Executive Director of the Center for Constitutional Governancewithout a warrant, held her for four days in violation of constitutional limits. In his New Year’s Eve speech, Museveni said this explicitly instructed security forces to use more tear gas against opposition supporters, whom he called criminals. In the days that followed, security forces used tear gas, pepper spray and physical violence to disperse opposition demonstrations. Hundreds of Wine supporters were kidnapped or detained.
The government dismantled the infrastructure needed for independent oversight. Authorities suspended five prominent human rights organizations, and two days before the vote, the Uganda Communications Commission imposed a nationwide internet shutdown, ostensibly to prevent disinformation. The blackout ensured that election day irregularities would go undocumented.
Election irregularities and violence
Election day was plagued by technical glitches, but also Wine, once again the major challenger claimed large-scale ballot stuffing and kidnapping of polling stations. The head of the electoral commission admitted receiving personal warnings from senior government officials against declaring some opposition candidates the winners.
International observers tried to use diplomatic language, noticing the environment was “relatively peaceful” compared to 2021, while serious concerns were raised about harassment, intimidation and arrests. She recognized that the internet outage hampered their ability to document irregularities.
Post-election violence alleged at least twelve lives. The deadliest incident took place in Butambala district, where security forces were located killed between seven and ten opposition supporters. Wine was placed under house arrest while the count took place under opaque conditions. The results were announced by region rather than by polling station, limiting observers’ ability to validate them. According to the official countMuseveni won with about 71 percent, while Wine’s numbers fell to 25 percent from 35 percent in 2021. Rise was only 52 percent, meaning more than 10 million eligible voters stayed home.
A generational breaking point
Ugandans average age is 17; 78 percent of people are under 35 years old. Most have known only one president. Wine, a 44-year-old singer-turned-politician whose music had long resonated with the frustrations of young Ugandans, campaigned on promises of change. But he has now been defeated twice in a very unequal race.
Young people have sought other ways to make their voices heard. In 2024, they took to the streets to protest against corruption, but faced violence from security forces mass arrests.
Opportunities for change seem blocked. The opposition’s parliamentary representation is insufficient for meaningful reforms. Civil society organizations face restrictive laws and lack international support. International partners are silent because Uganda is strategically valuable: it supplies troops for regional operations, hosts two million refugees, facilitates Chinese and French oil drilling, and recently decided to accept American deportees.
Given his age, Museveni is unlikely to run again in 2031. But now that the authority is increasingly concentrating on a tight inner circle of family membersa democratic transition may be less likely than an eventual transfer of power to his son. Uganda’s young majority faces a difficult choice: accept a status quo that offers no prospects, or confront a security apparatus that has spent years perfecting the use of force.
Ines M. Pousadela is CIVICUS head of research and analysis, co-director and writer for Citizen lens and co-author of Report on the state of civil society. She is also professor of comparative politics at the University of Amsterdam ORT University Uruguay.
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