In his book, curious entitled Only in the Ring Decree in critical timesGeneral NC Vij, former head of the army (Coas), catches the imagination of readers with an absorbent story of recent military campaigns and the administrative reforms that have been undertaken under his stewardship. He argues strongly for the need for a well -defined national security strategy (NSS), which expressed concern that some important military reforms are being stopped without a clear NSS.
The author follows the cause of the Kargil conflict and states that “conquest of Kashmir has always been an obsession with Pakistan and is deeply embedded in his national psyche”. He analyzes the conflict in detail, consults on political considerations, challenges with which joint planning and implementation, intelligence failure, learned lessons and results from the Kargil conflict. He appreciated the role of the IAF, which limits its activities to the Indian side of LOC, concludes that this strategy prevented Pakistan to put his own air force into battle. The author quotes the former DG ISI, Gen Shahid Aziz of Pakistan, who in a later years known that the Kargil -traffic investigation was a failure and the Pakistani military leadership did not succeed in anticipating the Indian reaction, which immediately resembles the nasleep of the recent wrong language in Pahalgam.
The attack of the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 every Indian raged, and public opinion was strongly in favor of a rapid military reaction to teach Pakistan a lesson. Although all five terrorists of Jem and Lashkar-e-Taiba who made the attack were shot in parliament building, Pakistan refused to recognize his involvement despite the provision of sufficient evidence. What followed was “Operation Parakram”, with which the author went into detail. After the rapid mobilization in the first week of January 2002, the army chef stated that the army was ready for war together with the IAF and the Indian Navy, who also declared their operational readiness.
Military offensive avoided
Confirmation of the same by the National Security Advisor and instructions that India was ready to cross the locomotive, sent ripples over the international community. Under pressure from the US and the Western powers, Gen Musharraf resorted to softened Overtures, who convinced Indian political leadership to avoid a military offensive despite the full mobilization. Stating General Padmanabhan, who was then the army leader, the author tells that dilemma and lack of clarity in political leadership prevented the Indian forces from achieving considerable military profit, including the possible conquest of disputed territory in J&K.
Writing About India’s Role in Peace Keeping Missions, Gen Vij describes The Circumstans Under What Ik 3,660 Indian Soldiers Were deployed as a part of a Un Mission in Sierra Leone in Early 2000. However, in May 2000, 223 Indian Soldier and Eleven Milaryyer and Eleven Milaryy’s A. Eleven A Milaryys A. Milarynies A Milaryys A. Milarynies and Eleven A. Milaryys A. Rediery A. Milaryys A. Milaryys A. Milaryys Aalbaryys and Eleven Allary and Eleven Aalbaryys A. Group – Revolutionary United Front (RUF). When diplomacy and negotiations did not obtain the release of hostages, even after 75 days in captivity, military action was added, releasing all hostages. The operation demonstrated the potential of the Indian forces, while praises from all over the world and the careful planning and implementation praised with minimal collateral damage.
The author explains how he always believed that setting up a strong fence along the locomotive was the most certain way to limit infiltration and cross -border training. When he became the COAs, when the author discussed the proposal internally, the feedback was anything but encouraging, with some seniors rejecting the suggestion as impractical and reflecting a defensive mindset.
But the chef continued to exist with his idea and convinced his colleagues to set up a fence on a test base. True to his conviction, a substantial reduction of infiltration was observed on site, and soon army leadership worked on expanding the project to other areas. Despite heavy shooting of the border and other complexities confronted, a 740 km fence in just over a year was built by Indian troops, which was later improved and expanded by his successors.
Theater assignments
Writing about the “cold start doctrine”, which was conceptualized during Operation Parakram, the author states that it has been further improvised and perfected over the years. He strongly argues for the need to evolve from purely “joint” to an advanced level of “integration and interoperability” among the armed forces, in particular to use emerging technologies. He supports the idea of setting up theater assignments, with a suggestion that theater commanders have to report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee via the CDs, which can be a matter of debate.
About the various administrative reforms that are implemented in the last few years of his service, the author explains the reasoning to increase the number of vacancies in all ranks, thereby guaranteeing a younger age profile of the commander officers, and how it was achieved by the recommendations of the AV Singh Committee in two different phases. He also writes about how he has passionately insisted on implementing the ex-service contribution Health Scheme (ECHS), who has improved veterans and their families in the past two decades. His contribution to promoting such causes not only had a positive influence on soldier as a profession, but also his concern for families and their well -being, which will forever serve as an inspiration for future military leaders.
“Wars are always unpredictable and that is why we must always be prepared,” concludes General Vij in the book, which is contemporary, fascinating and informative. It is a great reading for all military book lovers.
The Reviwer, GP Capt Dr. R Venkataraman (RETD), is General Manager, Madras Management Association)
You can find the book here.
Published on June 20, 2025
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