SAN FRANCISCO, USA, Dec 2 (IPS) – In a Truth Social post that reverberated around the world, President Donald Trump wrote on October 29: “Because of other countries’ testing programs, I have directed the War Department to begin testing our nuclear weapons on an equivalent basis.”
A month later, it remains unclear which “testing programs” Trump had in mind. Except for North Korea, which last tested in 2017, no country has conducted nuclear explosion tests since 1998.
Some commentators speculated that Trump was referring to tests of nuclear weapons delivery systems, as Russia had just conducted tests of innovative systems, a long-range torpedo and a nuclear-powered cruise missile.
Perhaps to underline that the United States is also testing delivery systems, in an unusual press release on November 13 edition Sandia National Laboratories announced a test in August in which an F-35 aircraft dropped inert nuclear bombs.
However, it appears that the tests in question involve nuclear warheads. In what was clearly an attempt to limit the implications of Trump’s announcement on November 2, Energy Secretary Chris Wright said said regarding US plans that “I think the tests we’re talking about now” involve “non-critical” rather than “nuclear” explosions. The Energy Department is responsible for the development and maintenance of the nuclear arsenal.
Trump’s, on the other hand comments In an interview recorded on October 31, alleged underground tests of nuclear explosions by Russia, China and other countries are referred to as a basis for parallel US tests. His comments may have been prompted by years of US intelligence assessments that Russia and China have conducted experiments with extremely low yields that cannot be detected remotely.
The cautious approach is to assume that Trump is talking about an American return to testing nuclear explosions. That assumption is reinforced by the fact that a few days after Trump’s social media post, the United States was the only country to do so to vote against a UN General Assembly solution support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The Russian government is following this approach. On November 5, President Vladimir Putin spoke ordered relevant authorities to study the possible start of preparations for explosive testing of nuclear warheads.
US resumption of nuclear explosion tests would be a disastrous policy. It would increase the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs, making nuclear conflict more likely. Nuclear tests can indeed act as a kind of threat.
It would also likely encourage and facilitate the nuclear arms race between the United States, Russia and China. In the longer term, nuclear explosion tests would encourage additional countries to acquire nuclear weapons as they come to terms with the major powers’ increased dependence on nuclear weapons.
Resumption of nuclear test explosions would also violate U.S. international obligations. The United States and China have signed, but not ratified, the CTBT. Russia is in the same position, having withdrawn its ratification in 2023 to maintain parity with the United States. Due to the lack of the necessary ratifications, the CTBT has not yet entered into force. Since the CTBT negotiations in 1996, the three countries have imposed a moratorium on nuclear explosion testing.
This attitude is consistent with the international law obligation, enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of a signatory State to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.
The purpose and purpose of the CTBT is perfectly clear: to prevent and prohibit the conduct of a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
The CTBT is a major multilateral agreement with an active implementation organization that manages a multi-faceted global system to verify the testing ban. It sets a precedent for a future global agreement or agreements that would control fissile materials used to make nuclear weapons, control missiles and other delivery systems, and reduce and eliminate nuclear arsenals.
Sidelining or eviscerating the CTBT due to an outbreak of nuclear explosion testing would undo decades of progress toward achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.
A return to nuclear explosion testing would also be incompatible with compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Its Article VI requires negotiations for “an early end to the nuclear arms race.”
Nuclear explosion tests have long been seen as a driver of nuclear arms races. The preamble to the NPT recalls the determination expressed in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which bans above-ground nuclear testing, “to strive for the cessation forever of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and to continue negotiations to this end.”
In 1995, as part of a package allowing the indefinite extension of the NPT, a review conference promised to conclude negotiations on the CTBT by 1996, which it achieved. In 2000 and 2010, review conferences called for the CTBT to come into force.
Resume testing of nuclear explosions despite a comprehensive ban having been negotiated, and supporting the design and development of nuclear weapons through such testing, would be a profound rejection of a key goal of the NPT, which is to end the nuclear arms race.
That would erode the legitimacy of the NPT, which has served as a major barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons since 1970. The next evaluation conference will take place in spring 2026. Resuming nuclear explosion tests, or intensifying preparations for them, would seriously undermine any prospect of an agreed outcome.
It is imperative that the United States does not resume explosive testing of nuclear weapons. It would be a very severe blow to the web of agreements and norms that limit nuclear weapons and provide the basis for their elimination, and it could even lead to the truly catastrophic consequences of a nuclear conflict.
IPS UN Office
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