CIVICUS discusses Generation Z-led protests in Bulgaria with Zahari Iankov, senior legal expert at the Bulgarian Center for Not-for-Profit Law, a civil society organization that advocates for participation and human rights.
Bulgaria has recently experienced its largest protests since the 1990s, largely driven by young people frustrated by corruption and institutional decay. What started as resistance to budget measures quickly escalated into broader demands for systemic change. The Prime Minister’s resignation has led to Bulgaria’s seventh elections since 2021, but whether this cycle of repeat elections will ultimately answer fundamental questions about institutional integrity, informal power structures and the enduring influence of the oligarchy remains to be seen.
What led to recent protests?
Bulgaria has been in a prolonged political crisis since 2020 massive protests broke out for the first time against corruption and state capture. Although they did not immediately lead to resignations, these protests marked the beginning of a cycle of repeated elections and unstable governments. Since 2021, Bulgaria has held several parliamentary elections, and there has been no political settlement.
The latest protests, which broke out on December 1, are likely the largest since the early 1990s, during Bulgaria’s transition from communism to democracy. They were initially sparked by a controversial 2026 budget that raised taxes to finance public sector wages, but while economic concerns played a role, the protests were largely about values. People responded to the fact that democratic rules were openly ignored and that governance was increasingly shaped by informal power and personal interests.
Several incidents reinforced the perception that institutions were being systematically undermined. A symbolic moment was the treatment of student representatives during parliamentary debates on education, including proposals for compulsory religious education. MPs publicly shamed student council representatives, which was seen by many as emblematic of a wider disregard for citizen participation and government accountability.
Other cases reinforced this perception: environmental laws were weakened without debate, key regulatory bodies remained inactive for more than a year to suggest that threatened freedom of expression were introduced and only withdrawn after public backlash. Together, these incidents created a sense that institutions were being eroded.
The budget acted as a trigger, but public anger had been building for months. During the government’s short mandate, there was a clear pattern of sidelining public participation and circumventing parliamentary procedures. Laws were rushed through committees in seconds, major reforms were proposed without consultation, and controversial decisions were made at moments designed to avoid opposition.
What made these protests different from previous ones?
A striking difference was the speed and scale of the mobilization. What started as a protest related to budget concerns quickly turned into huge demonstrations involving tens of thousands of people. Estimates suggest that between 100,000 and 150,000 people gathered in Sofia, the capital, during the largest protest. For such a small country this was impressive. Also unlike previous mobilizations, these protests spread far beyond Sofia and to many cities across the country, something unusual for Bulgaria’s highly centralized political system.
Another key difference was the strong presence of young people, leading to the protests being described as Gen Z protests. While young people also played a role in major protest movements in 2013 and 2020, this time the generational identity was much more visible and explicitly embraced. Young people were central as communicators and as participants. Social media campaigns, humor and memes played an important role in spreading information and mobilizing support.
Furthermore, these protests were not driven by a single political party. Although one party provided logistical support in Sofia, the scale of participation and geographical spread made it clear that this was a broad social mobilization, and not a partisan campaign.
What role did organized civil society groups play in sustaining the protests?
There were a number of civil society groups involved in organizing protests, but the main role of organized civil society was not to mobilize, but to provide crucial long-term support. For years, civil society groups and investigative journalists have documented corruption, challenged harmful laws, and mobilized public awareness around environmental and rule of law issues.
As traditional media came under increasing control, civil society helped fill this gap by exposing abuses and explaining complex issues in accessible ways. This helped counter the narrative that ‘nothing ever changes’ and empowered people to believe that protest could make a difference.
At the same time, there are attempts by politicians to discredit or intimidate civil society organizations, including proposals that resemble this laws to stigmatize civil society as a foreign agent underlined how influential civil society has become.
Who are the figures at the center of the public anger, and what do they represent?
The two key figures are Boyko Borissov and Delyan Peevski, who represent two different but entrenched forms of political power. Borissov, a former mayor of Sofia and prime minister who has dominated Bulgarian politics for more than a decade, maintains a loyal voter base despite major scandals and has repeatedly returned to power through elections. He built his image on strong rhetoric and visible policing.
Peevski is a different figure. Sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act – a US law that targets people involved in corruption and human rights abuses – he has never enjoyed widespread public support but wields enormous informal influence. Despite leading a political party, he largely operates behind the scenes. Over the years, he has been associated with deep penetration of the judiciary, influence over regulators and media control. His role in government has become increasingly visible, despite his party not formally being part of the ruling coalition.
Together, these two figures embody what protesters see as the fundamental problem: a mafia-style governance system, where access, decision-making and protection depend on proximity to powerful individuals rather than transparent institutional processes.
Does the government’s resignation provide a solution to the underlying problems?
This was a political response, but it does not solve the structural problems that caused the protests. Bulgaria’s institutions remain weak, key regulatory bodies continue to operate with expired mandates and the judiciary continues to face serious credibility problems.
What happens next will largely depend on voter participation and political renewal. Turnout in recent elections has fallen below 40 percent, undermining any claims of legitimacy and facilitating vote buying and clientelism. A mass turnout would significantly reduce the impact of these practices and could be our only hope for real change.
However, lasting change will require measures to restore institutional independence, reform the judiciary and ensure that regulatory bodies function properly. Otherwise, a new government risks being undermined by the same informal power structures that brought people onto the streets.
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© Inter Press Service (20251226083944) — All rights reserved. Original source: Inter Press Service
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