This photo of the US Navy 14 March 2003 shows soldiers from the United Arab Emirates, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), who discharges a BMP3 tank in this Kuwaitse Havenfacility from his L62 Elbahia – a landing vessel that is similar to the US LCU. The GCC, which consists of Kuwait, Vae, Suadi Arabia, Baharain, Oman and Qatar, continues his 12-year collaboration with a show of support for his golf neighbor. AFP Photo/HO (Photo by US Navy/US Navy/AFP) (Photo by US Navy/US Navy/AFP via Getty Images)
US Navy/AFP via Getty images
Less than a week after Israel had launched an unprecedented air raid, aimed at the political leadership of Hamas in the capital of Qatar, Doha, and several of the Arab Gulf states doubt the value of their security partner with the United States. If history serves as the only guide, none of these six Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council-Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain is probably supplementing more than just their military arsenals from non-Western countries.
Multiple Reports and analyzes In the immediate aftermath of the air raid on DOHA on 9 September, noted that the Israeli strike had led the Arab Gulf States to ask fundamental questions about their existing security schemes with the United States.
For example the Los Angeles Times observed The fact that the GCC states “had established their defense” on organizing American bases on their soil-Qatar is home to the largest, al-outdoors outside of Doha, only miles from the Site of Israel-and buying billions of dollars in dominating American and European weapon systems.
“The thinking was that users of American weapons and having an American military presence was a virtual guarantee for protection as enemies came to call,” the report noted, adding that the strike of Israel “built up”.
However, it is unclear whether something fundamentally will change when it comes to the purchasing choices of these rich Gulf states. As speculated here, Qatar can try to indicate his displeasure to the US about the attack of Israel by buying advanced Chinese air defense systems to diversify with non-Western military hardware. But even that would only be largely supplemented in the western military arsenal, not replaced, and again, that is only when Doha even buys such systems.
The same applies to the other Gulf states. Saudi Aarabia and the VAE have worked diligently to diversify their military arsenals. Yet these arsenals mainly consist of Western weapons, in particular the more advanced systems.
That has been consistently the case for decades. GCC members have always exercised their rights to buy non-Western weapons when they consider it necessary, but never to a extent that these alternative weapons saw are the spearhead of their respective soldiers.
Some Gulf States bought military hardware from Moscow in the days of the Soviet Union. Kuwait started this trend with His acquisition From 2k92 Luna-M Artillery Rocket Systems, called Frog-7S of NATO, in 1977.
According to the database of the Stockholm International Peace Institute’s Arms Transfers, Kuwait would also acquire hundreds of man-wordly strela-2 air weather systems shortly thereafter.
The refusal of Washington to sell certain weapons to the GCC countries for the benefit of Moscow. For example, Kuwait signed a weapon agreement of $ 300 million with Moscow in 1984 after Washington refused to sell the shoulder-fired FIM-92 Stinger missiles. The deal was for equivalent Soviet Strela-3s and 9K33 OSA Mobile Air Defense Systems at low altitude.
In 1986, Iranian war aircraft emirati oil platforms attacked the coast of the capital, Abu Dhabi. Staggering the unprecedented incident, the Vae asked Stingers from Washington. Just like with Kuwait, the Reagan administration refused. Consequently, Abu Dhabi turned to Moscow for Strela-3S.
Saudi Aarabia turned to China because of the willingness of Beijing to export ballistic missiles. Consequently, in the late 1980s, Riyad received DF-3A rockets and only paraded them in public for the first time in 2014. Riyad also turned to Beijing for more accurate DF-21s in 2007. Qatar later revealed that the Chinese Sy-400 rocket systems had acquired in 2017.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf States continued to buy considerable amounts of Russian military hardware.
In the nineties, both Kuwait and the VAE bought hundreds of Russian BMP-3 infantry fighter vehicles and BM-30 Smerch Multiple Launch Rocket Systems to increase their respective landmans.
Russian Made Smerch Multiple Launch Rocket Systems of the Kuwaitse Land Force Fire while participating in a military exercise in the Military Assortment Udaira, about 140 km north of Kuwait City, on November 18, 2021, as part of the ‘Gulf-Schietbeelte) and the Exercise with the Exercise with the Exercise. (Photo by Yasser Al-Zayyat / AFP) (Photo by Yasser Al-Zayyat / AFP via Getty images)
AFP via Getty images
Even more important is that Abu Dhabi has financed the development of the unique Broek-S1-drug-sized air defense system from Russia, so that units up to three years old Before the Russian army even did. Saudi Arabia ordered discreet Pantir-S1s, which theoretically could offer theoretical cost-effective point of departure against threats such as drones in the early 2020s.
Yet these Russian systems are only part of the multi -layered air defense of both adjacent Gulf states. The more advanced air defenses of the VAE will undoubtedly remain his American MIM-104 Patriot and Terminal at high altitude defense systems. The air defense of Saudi Arabia is also highly dependent on the Patriot and the Thaad, which Riyadh has recently been hired.
Russia insisted on the sale of its strategic S-400 system to the Arabian Golf in the years 2010, but eventually never won export contracts, although Saudi Arabia and Qatar seriously considered them to buy and ultimately chose alternatives. In addition, the VAE and Saudi Arabia have also ordered the KM-SAM system of South Korea in recent years on Russian or Chinese systems.
Moreover, none of the GCC states has Russian or Chinese main combat tanks.
The VAE turned to France for a large fleet of Leclerc main combat tanks and until recently was the only foreign operator. Likewise, Oman was the only foreign buyer of Great -Britain, Challenger 2 until the United Kingdom delivered some to Ukraine after the current war with Russia started in 2022. Muscat evaluated the K2 Panther tank of South Korea at the end of 2010, but there are no indications that it has tested a deal. There are no indications that it is interested in Russian or Chinese main combat tanks. And while the Gulf states have acquired Russian and Chinese several rocket launch systems, they were purchased alongside Western MLRs, such as the Himars.
In the late years 2010, Kuwait briefly considered Russian T-90MSS, but did not go through and seems happy with the American M1A2 Abrams, who recently ordered the new M1A2K variant. The Kleine Island Kingdom of Bahrain also ordered 50 M1A2S in 2024, and the backbone of the neighboring country of the Saudi Arabia consists of hundreds of Abrams tanks, despite reports in the late 2000s that it considered a significant acquisition of T-90s.
In the years 2010, China would enter the lucrative GCC weapon market. Just when Riyadh turned to Beijing for ballistic rockets that no Western country would sell it, many GCC statements did the same when China agreed to sell armed drones when the United States would not. Consequently, the Chinese wing Loong 2s began to appear in the Saudi and Emirati-Arsenalen.
Men walk past a Chinese Caig Wing Loong II Medium Altitude Long Endurance (Male) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), shown during the Dubai Airshow 2019 on November 18, 2019. (Photo by Karim Sahib / AFP) (photo by Karim Sahib / AFP via Getty Images)
AFP via Getty images
That seems to change in the 2020s, with the Trump administration expected reinterpret The regime of rakette technology control so that the US can sell Saudi Arabia 100 MQ-9 Reaper drones. Similar American drone sales to the VAE and Qatar will probably continue as soon as Washington rewinds its obligations under that Treaty of 1987 and will probably exceed the number that China has sold to the region so far.
The sale of fighter jets is an area where the US, Britain and France have long had a lead under the GCC states. Qatar operates three 4.5 generation hunters, all Western. Saudi Arabia operates advanced F-15s and Eurofighter Typhoons and has investigated to acquire the French Dassault Rafale. The VAE has long had a very unique and advanced variant of the F-16, the tailor-made F-16E/F-block 60 and French Mirage 2000S, which will soon replace it with 80 Rafale F4S. And while Abu Dhabi, together with Russia, developed a fifth generation fighter jet with Russia, that project has been stuck since then, probably for an indefinite period of time.
The VAE has bought a small number of L-15A trainer-jets from China. However, there are currently no indications that it continues with buying advanced 4.5-generation jets, such as the Chengdu J-10C powerful dragon or the next fifth generation Shenyang J-35 van Beijing. China is too Unlikely will export The most important fifth generation hunter, the J-20 Mighty Dragon.
Abu Dhabi has signed signs It is potentially interested in collaboration with the Boramae Fighter Project in the South Korea. Saudi -Arabia is Reportedly interested When acquiring the upcoming TF Kaan Stealth Jet of Turkey.
While the Gulf states may reconsider aspects of their defense and purchasing policy, it seems very unlikely to be an important redeviation of buying military hardware, especially advanced equipment, from China or Russia and other rivals of the Western powers. Even Iran, which broke into the US in 1979, still has a largely American -equipped Air Force and has not had much success in replacing and upgrading its outdated fleet by more modern Russian or Chinese hunters.
Consequently, this decades of old trend of supplementing largely by Western military arsenals will probably continue for the near future. Moreover, these states will probably use other American states, such as South Korea, as alternative suppliers to maintain their long-term preference for purchasing diversification, while continuously improving and expanding their emerging arms industry to reduce their dependence on outsiders.
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